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Abstract 
How do consumers and farmers organize credence food transactions? This paper discusses this issue through 
the concept of Food Community Network (FCN). A FCN is defined as an organization where consumers and 
farmers integrate their goals organizing a network. FCN is based on pooling specific resources and using 
membership-based contracts, to assign decision and property rights. It implies an organization based on a 
combination of several democratic and communitarian elements, with few market-like and bureaucratic ones. 
Based on those concepts this paper proposes a research to analyse the FCN governance mechanisms. Real case 
studies collected through an internet-based investigation on Community Supported Agriculture in North 
America have been found. Applying (i) new institutional economics and (ii) organizational science arguments, 
the case studies were used to determine features that are useful to describe how FCN governance works. On 
one hand we used (i) new institutional economics based features such as pooling resources and contracting; (ii) 
on the other hand market-like, bureaucratic, communitarian and democratic elements represent the 
organizational science approach.  The results indicate a great variety of FCN organizational forms emerging in 
North America.   
Keywords: community supported agriculture, governance mechanisms, credence food transactions. 
 
1 Introduction 
Farmers and consumers are setting-up new organizations to exchange food worldwide 
(Pascucci, 2010). This is especially evident when food has the features of a credence good, so 
the way it is produced matters more than other attributes it entails. In previous studies this 
type of organizations has been defined as alternative supply chains, civic food networks or 
food community networks (FCNs) (Renting et al., 2003; Auglia et al., 2008; Bougherara et al., 
2009; Pascucci, 2010). In these organizations transactions of  credence foods are carried out 
through a direct interaction of consumers and farmers, who share resources and stakes. In a 
more recent contribution scholars proposed a more formalized approach to define this 
organization, mainly through a new institutional economics oriented approach, and using 
Grounded Theory as a methodological tool (Pascucci et al., 2011). However a clear and 
crystallized definition of FCN is far to be achieved. In this paper we propose a further step in 
the direction of identifying the elements constituting FCNs. We mainly build our analysis on 
organizational design arguments, by comparing new institutional economics approach with a 
more recent contribution in organizational science proposed by Grandori and Furnari (2008). 
More specifically in this paper we investigate different case studies from North America, 
mainly using internet-based sources and literature review.  
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2 The design of Food Community Network organization 
FCN is an emerging type of organization which often is challenging more traditional, 
“mainstream” type of organizations dealing with food production and distribution (i.e. 
supermarkets and hard discounts) (Hendrickson and Heffernan, 2002). More specifically FCN 
seems to be a competitive organization when it comes to exchange foods with higher degree 
of credence attributes. Those are foods for which “the way” they are produced and 
distributed is more important than “what” constitutes them (i.e. chemo-physical elements). 
Traditional organizations of credence foods are affected by the presence of several legally 
independent actors, like food companies, farms, public agencies and consumers (or 
households), which coordinate quantity and quality issues with means of standards, logos, 
brands and labels (Raynaud et al. 2005). All these actors have to deal with issues of 
asymmetric information and moral hazard problems, therefore often experiencing high level 
of transaction costs. Typical solutions are the use of organizations such as bilateral contracts, 
strategic networks and alliances, vertical integration (Ménard and Valceschini, 2005; 
Pascucci, 2010). Often these organizations rely on public monitoring (Vetter and 
Karantininis, 2002). However FCNs are organized in a different way. But how?  
According to preliminary empirical evidence, FCNs have been described as based on a group 
of highly motivated consumers and a (group of) producer(s) that decide to vertically 
coordinate, and partially integrate, on the base of a long-term relationship to produce and 
transact credence foods (Pascucci, 2010). In this section we have further investigate the 
organization of FCNs looking at two theoretical approaches: new institutional economics and 
organizational science. 
2.1 A new institutional economics perspective 
To characterize FCN from a new institutional economics approach we can look, for example, 
at different dimensions of the governance mechanisms and namely the degree of resource 
pooling, type of contracting mechanisms which can be divided in type of coordination, and 
type of internal or external competition (Williamson 1991; Ménard, 2004; Ménard and 
Valceschini, 2005; Karantininis, 2007). The governance mechanisms used in the FCN are 
based on intense resource pooling, while coordination is based on limited authority and 
relational contracts (Pascucci, 2010). Moreover limited competition among the members is 
present while external competition with other organizations (for example super-markets) is 
very high. Following this approach we can see FCN as a form of vertical integration between 
consumers and farmers, leading to the constitution of a hybrid such as a formalized network. 
The integration process is based on using membership to assign decision and property rights, 
and driven by the need of sharing and pooling resources which are specific for the members. 
When membership is strongly formalized then the network assumes the form of a club 
which, in some cases, can lead to the legal form of a producer-consumer cooperative. 
Resource pooling and sharing is slightly different between consumer and producer 
members: (1) consumers provide time, information, knowledge and financial resources by 
participating directly in the organization of production process; (2) farmers provide land and 
capital assets but also specific skills and knowledge (Pascucci, 2010). They also transfer 
decision rights to consumers. On one hand consumers receive as pay-offs leisure and 
credence foods while decreasing transaction costs (i.e. the costs of monitoring). The time 
spent by consumers in the production process is assumed to be leisure time (Pascucci et al., 
2011). The time allocated in the production process is either related to manual working and 
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to its organization (managerial tasks). The time allocated by consumers is also used to 
monitor the process, and therefore, to reduce the risk of producers moral hazard. Since 
consumers can coordinate participation (i.e. by turning the visits) and their time spending in 
participation is not a cost but an utility-enhancing activity, we can assume that the overall 
monitoring costs of the process can be considerably reduced by this mechanism. On the 
other hand farmers reduce part of production and transaction costs (i.e. labour costs, 
certification costs, etc.), uncertainty of specific investments and income instability (Pascucci, 
2010). Producers reduce their production or transaction costs by allowing consumers to 
direct participate to the organization of production process. They also limited uncertainty 
and can reduce lock-in problems of investing in specific assets related to the credence food 
production. 
2.2 An organizational science approach  
New institutional economics is limited in addressing the “micro-elements” of organizations 
(Grandori and Furnari, 2008). This constitutes a main shortcoming when scholars are trying 
to analyse “new type” of organizations, for which empirical evidence are still limited. This is 
the case of FCN. Grandori and Furnari (2008) proposed to overcome such a problem by using 
a “chemistry of organization” type of approach. Building on three theoretical frameworks in 
the tradition of organizational science, namely complementary and configurational 
approaches, transaction cost economics and contingency theory approaches, they identify a 
“combinative approach” to analyse multiple effective organizational combinations under 
different contingencies (Grandori and Furnari, 2008). Their approach is based on the 
identification of basic elements, “building blocks”, which constitute an organization. More 
precisely they distinguish between four categories of elements such as: (i) market-like 
elements, which include price-like and control-by-exit devices; (ii) bureaucratic elements, 
including formal rules and plans, and articulation of the division of labor;  (iii) communitarian 
elements, including knowledge and value sharing, and common culture; (iv) democratic 
elements, including the allocation of ownership, decision and representation rights. Market-
like elements mainly refer to  the capacity of coordinating action with minimal 
communication through highly powered incentives: bureaucratic elements are linked to 
formal elements of governance mechanisms such as  formal rules, procedures and 
evaluation systems. Community elements are related to organizational practices infusing 
cohesion and aligning interests, for example through  value and knowledge sharing. Finally 
democratic elements refer to the diffusion of ownership, decision and representation rights 
which enable the organization to integrate different interests among and between their 
members (Grandori and Furnari, 2008).  
In this approach it is assumed that combination of different elements are not only possible 
but constitute the potential advantage of an organization. This is particularly useful in the 
case of FCN where a clear definition is still lacking and often contrasting elements persist at 
the same time. For example in market-like practices organization members base their 
decisions on the economic incentives they receive. In FCN consumers often pay a “market” 
price to farmers for the (box of) products delivered. Specific forms of “pay-for-performance” 
are also used. For example when the farmer receives a “premium” for “extra-quality” 
products, such as for niche or fresh products. However also discounts can be arranged, also 
for high-quality products, for example in case higher quantity of products are bought, or 
“share-based” payment are organized at the beginning of each season. In this case a lower 
price per product is not linked to lower quality, and it doesn’t work as a disincentive for the 
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farmer. On contrary it might positively affect trustworthiness between farmers and 
consumers, reinforcing the willingness to buy and produce high-quality products. Therefore 
it can be said that also the exchange activities of FCN are coordinated through a type of price 
mechanism.  
Although FCN are far from being a hierarchical type of organization, some form of authority, 
for example in some strategic decisions, is often adopted.  For example  authority is used to 
decide on investments, to control quality issues, to arrange delivery service and solve 
dispute between farmers and members. As indicated by Grandori and Furnari (2008) the 
main advantage in using bureaucratic-power is basically to have a higher capacity to control 
opportunism, especially where transaction costs are high or when specific investments were 
made by FCN members. However authority and bureaucratic elements represent a challenge 
for FCN because hierarchical mechanisms are often in contrast with cooperative behaviour 
and trust. FCN are often characterized by participatory decision-making, open access/open 
exit membership. This can lead to the problem of free-riding of some members (as in many 
cooperative-type of organizations). To address the issue of free-riding authority (and 
formalized rules) can be used to mitigate the tension between group-based interests and 
individual member interest.  
Communitarian elements constitute a fundamental component of FCN. They are formed by 
shared norms, which are mainly based on informal rules within each community. They are 
built to facilitate, motivate and coordinate type of collective actions led by community-
members because they can prevent opportunism by limiting the expectation that other 
members will behave opportunistically. In this way they can create trust and 
trustworthiness, which also can reduce transaction costs (Nooteboom, 2007). In FCN context 
trust is an important feature FCN for example to reduce the cost of safeguarding against 
opportunism. This is mainly due to information and knowledge exchange, which is leading to 
control on members’ reputation.  More in general communitarian elements can be effective 
in building trust if within the community shared norms can be created. This process is also 
leading to increase member involvement and commitment thus reducing the need for 
economic-based “punishment” for opportunistic behaviour, while supporting non-economic 
rewards for group loyalty. It is important to highlight that in communitarian practices 
participants are often trustworthy not due to control mechanism (punishment) or economic 
incentives (rewards), but because they choose on the basis of intrinsic motivation. In 
general, similar to other collective organizations, the capacity of FCN to build trust, and 
therefore reducing transaction costs, is conditional to the size and homogeneity of the group 
of participants\members. Especially in starting stage FCNs tend to select highly motivated 
members, while tending to exclude (indirectly) less aligned and motivated ones.  
Distinct from issues of trust and trustworthiness, democratic elements refer to the 
component of FCN based on sharing decision rights and fairness of decision making. A more 
participatory decision making and shared ownership on strategic resources are seen as 
enforcing commitment in the group interests, also leading to transaction costs reduction. 
Many FCNs adopt democratic procedures, for example to check quality of processes and 
products, to enhance investments. The possibility to control but also to deliberate on 
strategic issues is a fundamental aspect of FCN potential competitive advantage 
(Nooteboom, 2007). 
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3 Classification of FCNs: evidence from CSA in North America 
We have analysed and classified a sample of 95 Community Supported Agriculture operating 
in North America(U.S. and Canada). We implemented a K-means cluster analysis. We use 
data available on-line, through their web-sites and blogs. We collected this information in 
the second half of 2011. Using these information we derived variables related to both the 
new institutional economics approach, such as pooling and contracting, and the 
organizational science  approach, such as market-like, bureaucratic, communitarian and 
democratic elements. Of the various types of FCN, CSA are the most widespread in Anglo-
Saxon countries especially in urban and peri-urban areas of U.S and Canada. CSA are often 
established from an innovative dynamic strategy of farmers, who seek to establish relations 
with consumers in the same area. FCN are based on local food supply and maintain a high 
sense of community. CSA are often lead by educated and highly skilled farmers, who work in 
a mosaic of small-scale farms. CSA prosper where many small farms can satisfy consumer 
needs with a wide range of food products, for a sizable urban population living in proximity 
of those farms (Adam, 2006). The concept of CSA originated in the 1960s, when Japanese 
women, concerned with the increase in imported food and the loss of farmers and farmland, 
asked local farmers to grow vegetables and fruit directly for their families. Starting from that, 
a number of families committed themselves to supporting their region’s agriculture. In this 
way, the teikei concept was born which, literally translated, means “food with the farmer’s 
face on it” (Van En, 1995). This model, first implemented in the United States in the mid-80s, 
became known as CSA. As defined by Gradwell et al. (1999), CSA is a partnership between 
farmers and community members working together to create a local food system. CSA 
farmers may produce vegetables, fruits, meats, dairy products, fibres, etc., directly for local 
community members. CSA differs from direct marketing because its members commit to a 
full-season price in the spring, sharing the risks of production (Cicia et al., 2011). With this 
up-front support, farmers can concentrate on growing quality food and caring for the land. 
In return, members know where their food comes from and how it is grown; they share a 
connection to the land and farmers who produce for them, establishing a direct economic 
and social link between farmers and community members (Wells and Gradwell, 2001). Table 
1 describes the variables used to identify pooling and contracting elements:  
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Table 1. 
Pooling and contracting elements 
Element Variable Meaning Score 
Pooling 
Knowledge 
Yes if presence of practices to share 
knowledge between members and 
producers  
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Labour time Yes if members provide time to work in the community  
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Financial  capital 
Yes if members provide financial 
capital, for example through 
subscribing membership shares 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Physical capital 
Yes if members share their assets, such 
as machineries or facilities for 
supporting the activities of the 
community  
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Decision right on product 
portfolio quantity  
Yes if members can decide how much 
products to receive from  the CSA 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Decision right on product 
portfolio composition 
Yes if the members can decide the 
type of products to receive from the 
CSA 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Decision right on specific 
product quantity 
Yes if the members can decide the 
quantity of each product to receive 
from the CSA 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Decision right on specific 
product quality 
Yes if the members can decide 
whether receive organic or non- 
organic products 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Input   
Yes if the members provide inputs for 
the production process (other than 
labour and capital) 
Yes = 1 




If members directly participate and 
check farming processes 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Direct visit 
Yes if members can visit the farm 
(either in a flexible or a scheduled 
way) 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Quality checking 
Yes if members have the opportunity 
to comment, complain and discuss 
about the quality of the products (i.e. 
through a blog, website, etc.) 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Certification system 
Yes if a (private and/or public) 
formalized certification system is in 
place 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Contracting membership If the membership contract is formalized 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
Default conditions 
If in the contract is specified default 
conditions (i.e. default in deliveries, 
breakdown in quality levels, etc.) 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
 
Table 2 describes the organizational elements we used according to the organizational 
science approach: 
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Table 2. 
Organizational Science elements 
Element Variables Score 
Market-like 
Presence of incentive for subscribing annual shares Yes = 1 No = 0 
Presence of private quality certification system Yes = 1 No = 0 
Bureaucratic 
Participation in the community is formalized  Yes = 1 No = 0 
Subscription of annual shares is formalized Yes = 1 No = 0 
Formal public and\or private quality certification system Yes = 1 No = 0 
Formalized membership Yes = 1 No = 0 
Formalized default conditions Yes = 1 No = 0 
Scheduled visit in the farm Yes = 1 No = 0 
Participation in the production process is formalized Yes = 1 No = 0 
Communitarian 
Members are stimulate dot share knowledge Yes = 1 No = 0 
Participation in the community is informal Yes = 1 No = 0 
Participation in the production process is informal Yes = 1 No = 0 
Free-access to the farm Yes = 1 No = 0 
Informal certification system Yes = 1 No = 0 
Quality is checked through blogs, discussions and\or debates Yes = 1 No = 0 
Democratic 
Participation in the community is open Yes = 1 No = 0 
Quantity of products per box is jointly decided  Yes = 1 No = 0 
Portfolio composition of products is jointly decided Yes = 1 No = 0 
Quantity of each product is jointly decided Yes = 1 No = 0 
Quality of each product is jointly decided (i.e. organic non organic) Yes = 1 No = 0 
Type of inputs to be used is jointly decided Yes = 1 No = 0 
Production decisions are shared Yes = 1 No = 0 
Visiting the farm is possible Yes = 1 No = 0 
Information are shared  Yes = 1 No = 0 
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We use these variables to build indexes of intensity for the 6 elements of governance we 
have considered: pooling, contracting, market-like, bureaucratic, communitarian and 
democratic. We decided to not assign a weight to different variables, nor to different 
elements. Therefore each variable is equally contributing to determine the intensity of the 
relevant element. If the specific variable was found we assigned a score of 1, otherwise we 
gave a score of zero.  In table 3 we report the descriptive statistics of the 6 governance 
elements we have measured in the sample. 
Table 3. 
Descriptive statistics for the 6 organizational elements 
Element Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Market-like 0 2 1.22 0.47 
Bureaucratic 0 5 3.24 1.00 
Communitarian 0 6 3.27 1.82 
Democratic 0 7 1.81 1.44 
Pooling 1 9 4.06 1.62 
Contracting 0 11 5.62 2.49 
N. observation= 95  
 
4 Results 
The results of the K-means cluster analysis indicate the presence of 5 typologies of CSA. 
Table 4 shows the average values of the indexes of governance intensity for each typology: 
Table 4. 
Typologies of CSA 
Element 
Typologies 







Market-like 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.9 1.1 
Bureaucratic 3.7 3.9 2.9 2.1 3.1 
Communitarian 1.9 5.4 2.7 0.9 4.2 
Democratic 0.5 2.8 4.6 0.9 1.9 
Pooling 2.1 5.0 6.9 2.9 4.9 
Contracting 5.3 8.9 4.7 2.1 5.6 
N. of cases 22 22 7 16 28 
 
Group 1 is characterized by high level of formalization and contracting. We define this group 
as “bureaucrats” to indicate that the governance mechanisms are mainly based on 
formalized rules. The decision making is “centralized” and still remain in the area of power of 
the farmers. The “hard participants” are the ones belonging to group 2. In this group all 
indexes have high values and indicate a strong and extended participations of members in all 
activities and governance issues of the CSA. Group 3 is more based on democratic 
mechanisms than group 2 and more based on sharing resources. Group 4 is constituted by 
soft participants, to indicate that they are not that much involved in the CSA. Finally group 5 
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is mainly based on communitarian elements with a strong combination of both pooling and 
contracting issues.  
 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we have discussed and analysed CSA within the framework of food community 
networks. In this type of organization, consumers and farmers strongly integrate their 
functions by using combination of different organizational elements such as market-like, 
bureaucratic, communitarian, democratic, contracting and pooling. More specifically we 
have studied several CSA operating in North America. We have identified 5 main distinct 
typologies but also confirmed some common features. For example CSA often make use of 
very formalized membership, to definite not only the type of “delivering” service consumers 
would receive but also to share risks and transfer relevant decision rights. However we 
found that consumers decision rights on the production phase is sometimes limited, 
especially if we look at the allocation of land to different uses.  
The presence of different typologies of organizations is indicating that within the framework 
of FCN researchers have to further investigate internal organizational dynamics and link 
them to FCN different performances. In the current scientific debate on alternative or short 
supply chains a specific attention of these links between different organizational structures 
and performances is under-investigated. While there is a common understanding that FCNs 
can contribute, for example, to local sustainable development, it is still unclear which types 
of FCNs can be more suitable in doing that. Another issue to be addressed is to better 
understand participation and whether a specific organizational structure is leading the FCN 
to attract more a target group of members. Understanding the relation between type of FCN 
and type of participation mechanism can be important to better use them to implement 
development oriented strategies. Fro example FCNs can be suitable to preserve local 
products, or to increase healthy food diets in a target group. Understanding whether a more 
or less formalized membership  can facilitate participation can be considered as a key-factor. 
The analysis provided in this paper should be seen in the light of a descriptive contribution. 
Stricter research hypotheses on factors contributing to adoption of different governance 
mechanisms couldn’t be tested, given the type and the nature of available information. Also 
an analysis of FCN performance or members participation have to be implemented. These 
are points to be develop in a future research agenda.  
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